# Open Source Round 5

# 1AC

## 1AC – Emory

### Arms Control ADV---1AC

#### Advantage one is ARMS CONTROL.

#### The GBSD is a first-strike weapon---developments in counterforce targeting drive global arms racing

Snyder 18

Proponents argue the GBSD should improv counterforce t the stated need suggest to the world that the U S wish first-strike counterforce Advancing this is destabilizing driving a tech arms race awareness that its deterrent may be destroyed increase the chances nuc s will be used Regardless of other states acquisitions by the U S will destabiliz further the life of Minuteman could be extended gradually reducing the size of the force over time, either unilateral or in a nuclear agreement

#### Specifically, ICBM modernization generates reciprocal counterstrike pressure on Russia, which drives development of their ICBM forces

Perkovich 21

because silos are fixed enemy long-range weapons can destroy them The targets for U.S. ICBMs are silo targets The competition is circular Russia cites this U.S. force as the primary rationale for its own silo first-strike with multiple warheads and LUA In the Russian lexicon known as “reciprocal counterstrike

#### The plan ends the GBSD, which sets the stage for arms control negotiations to phase out ICBMs entirely---it has no effect on deterrence or assurance but motivates arms control talks

Hinck 21

to pause the G B S D will buy time for arms control with Russia Doing so will assure officials that the U S is not going “too fast” avoid disquiet among allies And motivate U.S. and Russian delegations to have straightforward discussions surrounding reductions There is good reason to extend Minuteman with the goal of decreasing ICBMs through agreements posture changes offset any drawbacks from the perspective of allies increasing sub s and bombers arms control make force structure more viable enable movement toward a dyad the U S should seek Russian reductions in the Sarmat

#### That undermines the targeting rationale for Russian ICBM modernization and creates a positive feedback loop for arms control

Blair 18

drawdown can be through arms control Scrapping targets would pull the rug out from Russian targeteers’ justification for rockets, including the Sarmat If U.S. targets disappeared, Russia would curb its heavy-missile deployment This would shorten Russian targets A positive feedback loop

#### Russia is open to further arms control talks despite other tensions---the U.S. being the first mover is key

Countryman 23

the U S is ready without preconditions to discuss new arms control the Kremlin welcomed remarks Russia would study with care any proposal This was in keeping with a long tradition: for 60 years Washington and Moscow keep nuclear separate from all other tensions Arms control is not brain surgery it’s not only treaties. Six decades have built a web of non-treaty agreements Putin’s war hangs a cloud over the environment But every success has required rather than waiting to resolve all differences to engage now to assume Russia will not respond is not resolve; it’s sidelining ourselves arms control require the U S to take the lead

#### A revived arms control infrastructure prevents global arms racing and existential conflict.

Arbatov 21

a new large-scale arms race augmented by offensive and defensive non-nuclear weapons space and cyber impact strategic stability will be multilateral, involving China, NATO India Pakista Korea, Japan, and others. The race would undermine non-prolif Iran and Saudi will join the nuclear club Through them, nuc s will inevitably fall to terrorists deterrence can serve security only in conjunction with limitation Without checks goes berserk endlessly brings nuclear war in crisis Only step-by-step disarm parallel with change in the strategic environment in negotiations provide a foundation for coop it may seem utopian However experience shows the situation can change quickly both for the better and the worse essential for survival of human civilization

#### Specifically, ending the GBSD creates momentum on arms control that limits Russia’s Sarmat ICBM system

Perkovich 21

a key objective should be to reduce the greatest instability silo-based ICBMs Russia deployed the Sarmat for Avangard boost-glide Each side’s silo force justifies the other’s strategic interactions create incentives to possibly use ICBMs Stability could be enhanced by discarding less survivable systems The timing is right Each country’s budgeting and planning is not finished Sarmat is nearing end of development GBSD is on the drawing board GBSD and Sarmat represent good starting points for horse-trading An agreement could be a c b m possible deployment create incentives to negotiate

#### The Sarmat creates Russian use-or-lose pressures---triggers nuclear accidents.

Lyon 17

we’re entering competitive modernisation Take the case of a Country B’s large first-strike force still to fire first the problem of the heavy, vulnerable ICBM lies at the heart of balancing Stability can be improved only by Country B lowering MIRV-ing and throw-weights in the mod context. The US is de-MIRVed Meanwhile, Russia’s replacing its heavy ICBM Too big to hide move and ignore, the RS-28’s locking us into the second scenario in which Russia deploy a destabilising heavy

### Procurement ADV---1AC

#### Advantage two is PROCUREMENT.

#### The Sentinel program is imploding---this will trigger a massive fight about reupping authorization.

Capaccio 12/14

The new i c b m risk blowing its cost estimate by so much that overruns trigger a review on whether to terminate costs trigger a law to warn lawmakers and force the Pentagon to reaffirm the rationale or face termination major delay or cost increase may embolden arms control advocates who pressed for termination in favor of extending the Minuteman the Pentagon would have to request more funds triggering major debate the challenge is the mammoth cost of construction

#### It’ll go through, but consume the entire DoD and gut defense.

Mesch 12/21

a cost breach require notification to Congress by Jan. 25 Sentinel is one of the most complex programs ever undertaken other projects see reduced funding to cover the cost just three years in we are learning 50% cost growth and delays the Air Force will need options that meet security needs that wouldn’t “consume the entire DOD budget.” “In this fiscally constrained environment extra billions to fix Sentinel come at the cost of other, critical programs an existing delay due to staffing shortfalls delays with clearance as well as info tech infrastructure problems the program is “struggling due to “unknown unknowns”

#### And, still won’t meet deadlines---hard constraints such as pit production ensure trade-offs that degrade the leg in the short-term.

Korda 21

the GBSD face inevitable significant delays administered by a young small that has no experience fielding a weapon the transition is itself a complication the warheads for GBSD are on an impossible timeline to meet the plan NNSA has set an unexecutable schedule analysts agree is impossible similar programs all experienced slippage and were cancelled If not ontime the GBSD could trigger depletion of ICBM force below New START life-extending ensure a viable ICBM while the riskier option result in a smaller force the Pentagon cannot afford both : to increase the GBSD means deprioritizing other programs these are fiscal time bombs

#### The spending ‘bow wave’ will crush conventional deterrence through trade-offs, debt, and blunt cuts by Congress.

Reif & Eaglen 18

to recapitalize the entire arsenal at the same time means less on each program increasing time and cost to each absence of planning will result in suboptimal choices sucking funding The longer leaders deny this the worse America’s deterrent reductions to mod could improve acquisition the federal fiscal outlook is dire will add $13 trillion in debt over the decade entitlement s interest payments mandatory spending tax cuts will pressure to slash defense political support for nuc s is fragile and far from assured claims the bill is affordable obfuscate the severity of the budget problem does not account for cost growth due to mismanagement or revisions At a service level are particularly stark Air Force’s new ICBM will compete with service priorities spending will more than triple Kehler former Strat Com bluntly am skeptical we are capable of a project like this without screwing it up likely is that current plans will collapse forcing reductions based on fiscal and political pressure rather than strategic decisions billions are squandered every dollar to bolster nuclear can’t be spent on non-nuclear to counter Russia and China

#### Causes great power war.

Deptula & Gunzinger 22

divestment created a smaller Air Force size is critical against China creating massed effects or surveilling areas Only air power can provide response on day one Defeating a fait accompli deterring a second aggressor, deterring nuclear attacks China and Russia recognize a window of opportunity to attack The nadir will occur in six years the same time China could assault Taiwan Inadequate budgets incentiviz China, Russia, and adversaries to pursue aggressive behavior

#### Trade-offs and doctrine degrade evolving deterrence against emerging existential threats---cutting the Sentinel is key.

Ferrari 22

competitors spent decades to undermine deterrence unconventional options exploit gaps info war munitions, and bio agents weaponized a i impose dilemmas to sink hundreds of billions to the triad are a modern-day Maginot Line. To understand priorities follow the money and lack of imagination The nuclear deterrent left the US vulnerable to new existential threats cyberattacks a pandemic corroded deterrence anarchy is loose denial forms the foundation of new defense resilience halt an aggressor preserving info and bio integrity in a whole-of-society effort cyberattacks pose a existential threat critically disrupt society to further geostrategic ends unprecedented lethality looms drone swarms gain decisive advantages biological agents could end all life on earth CRISPR made engineering easier immune to punishment DOD is well suited to providing capability but funds will not materialize without prioritization inflation translate to stagnant purchasing reflects limited appetite for spending reallocation is needed the traditional take a little here and a bit there is counterproductive. Instead the old triad fund the new existential threats imagine the Baltic s info conventional or bio could be immediately useful the static nuclear triad would do little to prevent hybrid aggression in Iran, No Ko and China nuc terror is hard to deter the Air Force should freeze the GBSD these would eliminate redundant capacity and free resources invested in other priorities resources frozen into the triad could be reallocated to withstand threats

#### The plan solves---reallocation saves deterrence from the cutting board.

Fetter & Reif 19

ICBMs are least valuable Instead of a cost to exceed $100 billion, the Pentagon could save scores of billions by continuing Minuteman deferring would free funds to pay other priorities reorient toward great-power competition the F-35, B-21, and new tanker

#### Independently---ongoing possession creates use-or-lose pressures. Only phase out solves.

Starberg 21

false alarms were systemic not error from an org theory perspective accidents may be rare, but are inevitable organized anarchies operate as political pursue self-interested goals are poorly understood even by participants especially with tech consequences obscure People come and go some biased others uninformed suffer unexpected bizarre interactions and common-mode failures Interactions occur quickly there is little flex and slack safety and redundancies are restricted to those planned for the system ICBMs clearly preference launch advantage in accuracy diminished over time new ICBMs suggest clear preference for preemption, as opposed to ride-out given the capability any president would be under enormous pressure to use it to wait would face strong criticism in a breakdown authority would pass down the chain when accidents do occur those tend to be catastrophic the empirical record suggest lacking appreciation of risks alarms were not rare that these did not escalate is because of the presumption of peace. Had one been called while strategic warning existed, things may have gone further

#### The Sentinel spikes accident risk.

Eaves 21

silos would “launch on warning computer s may glitch an error have disastrous consequences the GBSD is a forgotten subscription on auto-renew America should phase out land-based missiles spending reasons are political, and economic revolving doors campaign donations lobbying and companies more powerful than the Pentagon A low-probability is eventually going to happen

#### So does Ukraine.

O’Donnell 23

Putin suspended New START stopped sharing info This has real consequences chance of accidental exchange is in the next ten years 1 in 20 However calculations don’t count recent developments the revised estimat would be much worse

### Plan---1AC

#### The United States should phase out intercontinental ballistic missiles, halting replacements for the LGM-30 Minuteman.

### Solvency---1AC

#### SOLVENCY

#### The plan cancels ICBM modernization---this eliminates the ICBM leg of the triad through a gradual phase-out as missiles reach the end of feasible life extension by around 2065.

Harrison & Linck 17

the GBSD is the most aggressive plan that could be realistically executed to cancel the GBSD would ultimately eliminat the ground leg of the triad programs to extend life similar to the 90s would re-core the missiles, modernize guidance and upgrade ground and control systems would slow the test rate stay above 400 through 2050 the number would decline until re-cored missiles reach end of life this does not procure a new fleet costs would spread over decades

#### The Sentinel was just flagged for a ‘critical’ breach of Nunn-McCurdy requirements---the Pentagon can unilaterally cancel it.

Tirpak 1/18

Jan. 18, the Air Force sent notification of a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach headed for termination, unless Sec Def certifies Austin is expected to certify the program is essential There are no alternatives The program is higher priority than other s eliminated to pay

#### Zero downsides:

#### 1. LIFE EXTENSION---it’s technically feasible.

Perkovich & Vaddi 21

the Air Force analysis posited 400 missiles through 2075 that straight-line requirement predetermines the outcome more appropriate study would consider how long Minuteman could extend RAND concluded incremental life extension were feasible, and least costly If fewer are consumed in tests the stockpile would last through 2050 simulation may reduce the need motors of the same vintage launch payloads for space without problem arms agreements could obviate the need

#### Even if projected failure rates increase, this has no effect.

Korda 21

a 30-year core has p failure 1.3 percent an adversary would still target every silo there would be no way of knowing which were functional and which duds This would drop if the Air Force life-extend stability would not be affected If one accepts ICBM deterrence those simply need to exist This means Minuteman would produce the same deterrence

#### 2. DETERRENCE. ICBMs don’t affect war outcomes. Their studies are biased.

Montoya 21

replacing the Minuteman with GBSD is hotly debated A recent analysis by Kroenig the methods disregard the actual arsenal impossible and vastly overestimated ignores distance limit s imposed by MIRVed missiles and yield and accuracy treats all warheads as equal Russia does not have enough to target 3-on-1 MIRVed warheads cannot be arbitrarily divided Kroenig does mention yields and MIRVs when considering second strike Furthermore assumes b m d will destroy a quarter which by his own source may be optimistic the method gap directly support s Kroenig’s book a first strike by Russia is futile since U S sub s ensur 950 warheads survive Consequently, it make sense not to target ICBMs and reallocate to countervalue Russian second strike ICBM s are not targeted because they are presumed empty Russian SLBMs all expect to survive since sub s could disperse Even second strike without warning produced catastrophic results the U S could eliminate ICBMs entirely with 1-on-1 accurate SLBM s reserving warheads Coupled with deep reductions, extending life would be prudent With the sponge blast casualties for the strike which targets silos, were lower but total and long-term casualties were comparable The sponge absorbed warheads not destruction "the only move is not to play,"

#### They’re only tasked against Russia due to overflight concerns.

Korda 21

ICBMs with China or No Ko fly over Russia and trigger mistaken launch To avoid confusion sub s and bombers are assigned the nuclear mission ICBMs have little role beyond Russia coop through hotline would still be fraught altering trajectories could turn any launch risky at considerable expense

# 2ac – emory

## arms advantage

## procurement advantage

## T

### T No Gradual---2AC

#### 1. Elimination includes gradual, staged reduction to zero.

Nakamoto 20

the ballot calls for a phase-out by 35 and 50 incrementally over time We disagree that eliminate conveys suddenness in conflict with staged reductions the dictionary defines the word to mean cause disappearance the definition is compatible with a gradual process leading to reduction to zero

#### Restrict

Graber 95

A restriction is "a limitation without any necessary reference to the process that led to the placement of that restriction

#### Should

Lee et al. 15

should" is permissive, not mandatory should" means no more than obligation of expediency ]t does not express certainty as 'will' courts have held should" is used to describe obligation Opinion mischaracterizes these as mandatory

#### 2. For nukes, it’s a freeze now followed by a phase-out.

Wolfsthal et al. 3

elimination would include a verified freeze on current activities and a process that take years to complete

## Advantage CP

### Adv CP---Top---2AC

### Adv CP---Spending CP---2AC

#### Causes extinction.

Cochrane 20

debt must be financed by taxes economically destructive debt crisis result may be inflation Imagine we have another crisis pandemic war Add a huge recession the US needs to borrow $10 trillion investors and refuse the US then inflate or default, but crisis-mitigation policies are absent Greek rates were low until they weren’t Nobody expects debt crisis, or it would have already happened We cannot tell when conflagration will come. But can remove kindling

#### 3. The CP writes a blank check for an everything everywhere all at once foreign policy---ensures imperial overstretch AND trades off with domestic spending that’s vital for our whole-of-society resilience impact.

Lebow 20

Rep s want to starve the civilian government. They resent that budget goes to social services, which they want to stay poor The country needs just the opposite an expensive military needs justification and finds it in interventions less compromise more maximum demands seriously damaging to security and prestige undermined influence money, brainpower, and labor otherwise socially useful cuts should be justified by strategic planning

## Nuke Planets CP

### Nuke Planets---2AC

**Any colony would be dependent on earth for resources---human society is too complex to survive without support.**

**Morton 18**

**sustain humans** **technological**

colony must produce food, water, and oxygen **impossible** on **Earth** **not really that much like Mars** with **cold, dark, and radiation** equipment must function, **indefinitely** it must be possible to **repair** **without** supplies from Earth **local manufacturing** **with the colonists in the first place** **number of people** **specialized skills** **Robinson Crusoe would not last long on Mars** Self-sufficiency requires a **large number** **long-term survival** requires **genetic diversity** **hereditary defects** **diseases** **common** **already** soil on Mars is **Martian atmosphere** **transparent** **fatal to many cells** There is doubt whether **plant** **s** can **survive** **perchlorate** risk **explosion** complicating **oxygen** **scale** **interdependence of our society** **extremely hard to duplicate** dependence **mother culture** is **hard to avoid** **high-tech** devices are **not going to be designed there** **quirk** **redesigned** **transported** **I am extremely sceptical that a colony of the size that we could send to Mars in the next decades, perhaps in the next century, could sustain itself without frequent supplies and reinforcements from Earth** **undercut** **main purpose** **surviving an earthly catastrophe**

## MQD CP

### Process---Top---2AC

#### 9. Foreign policy certainty demands political stability.

Ikenberry ’15

critical in stabilizing i r in a world of radical power disparities is character of America The outside world can see policymaking at work reach of heg has been driven by efforts to render power predictable mature institutions made it predictable The regularized way policy is made reduces surprises s o p create a system that reduces aggressive moves messiness can confuse foreign observers

#### 10. Sanctions are bad and fail---empirics, special interests, national interest.

**Bandow 18**

**ev** **rarely** **fundamental interests** **resisting** **concessions** **even more fiercely** **even** **rarely change** **Communism continues** **to reign** **in Cuba**

**Sudan’s government** **remains authoritarian** **specialists** **ever** **nuc** **s** **Putin has not buckled** **under economic pressure** **Instead** **non-economic ways** **Gaddafi** **serious** **concessions** **North** **Korea** **decades** **to come** **Sanctions are worse than ineffective** **deaths of** **a** **half million Iraqi babies** **did not dispute it** **“smart sanctions,”** **interest groups** **impossible** **lasted** **a half century, despite dramatically changed circumstances**

## Trump CP

### Trump---2AC

#### 4. A laundry list of black swans---third parties, events, health issues, jail

BBC 11/5

anything can happen in a year the low approval of Biden and Trump open the door to West, and R F K What if one of them dies Biden will be 82, Trump will be 78 Ukraine Israel' Taiwan would scramble the election factors are out of control What if Trump goes to prison? The president faces 91 charges

## CTC DA

### Politics DA---2AC

#### 2. Turn---aff diffuses those fights.

Ellsberg & Solomon 21

rather than confront all ICBMs Congress focus on stopping new ones Tacit acceptance of the Minuteman to block GBSD sends a message that ICBM isn’t bad implicitly reinforcing the land triad

#### 4. Plan popular.

Korda 21

Biden should review GBSD not continue would be overwhelmingly supported by the public on a bipartisan basis opposition was reflected in the 2020 survey Dem s and Rep s support alternative policy

#### 5. Not spending PC. Their ev says he supports the tax credit. But what he’s fighting for is the full thing, NOT the watered down nonsense in this deal.

Pecorin & Schulze 1/16

Biden remains committed to fighting for the full C T C Wyden and Smith’s is not the expanded C T C implemented by Biden

#### Won’t pass AND PC fails.

Guo 1/16

the c t c and tax breaks face a challenging road steep obstacles in Congress laboring to tackle even basic government major hurdles remain resistance from Senate Rep s, and House Dem s argued it should do more Smith and Wyden’s top tax counterparts have not endorsed Beyond funding lawmakers focused on immigration Ukraine an election cycle the chance is pretty nil

## Arms Ctrl Bad DA

### Arms Control Bad---2AC

#### 6. Terrorism and rogue states are not a threat.

Fettweis 22

terrorists, appear near the top most lists of threats rogue states have risen International terrorism is not on the rise Police action against terrorism is much less expensive than wa Fears of “safe havens” arising out of state failure are misplaced al Qaeda did not flourish in a failed state. It was sheltered by the most coherent government that Afghanistan has had since the mid-1970s. that the number of failed states is not increasing

#### Russian modernization’s driven by the requirement to offset strategic delivery vehicle inferiority. Over the long run, removing this pressure brings them to the arms control table.

Reif & Sanders-Zakre 20

the U S maintain more weapons than they need numerical advantages would not change deterrence the U S possesses more delivery systems Such provides Russia incentive to MIRV to keep up such as Sarmat Washington should not give Moscow an excuse to a bloated arsenal decision to reduce would put the U S in a stronger position

to pressure Russia to rethink recapitalization and reduce warheads

decisions the U S is making must consider longer term

# 1ar

## Adv 1

## Adv 2

## AT – Adv CP

## AT – Arms Control DA

## AT – T

### T No Gradual---C/I

#### It’s what advocates mean by the term.

Lowry & Collina 16

William Perry was asked how he would phase out His answer was simply not recapitalize it

Eliminating ICBMs wouldn’t happen overnight would be phased out over years

#### It can be gradual or instantaneous.

ILC 53

discussion was based on a misunderstanding of "elimination". Elimination could be instant or gradual